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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V. : Case No. 940157-CA 
WAYNE M. GAUGER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft of an operable 
motor vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) . This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. After conducting the balancing test required by rule 609 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence and State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1986), did the trial court act reasonably in admitting 
defendant's prior conviction for burglary? 
If, after performing a balancing test, a trial court 
determines that evidence is admissible, the appellate court reviews 
that decision for correctness. "But in deciding whether the trial 
court erred as a matter of law, we de facto grant it some 
discretion, because we reverse only if we conclude that it acted 
unreasonably in striking the balance. If we conclude that the 
1 
trial court erred, we may characterize that ruling as "an abuse of 
discretion," but in reality we have found that the court committed 
legal error and that the unfairly prejudicial potential of the 
evidence outweighs its probativeness." State v. Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 
774, 781-82 n. 3 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). See also State 
v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993). 
2. Where a prosecution witness volunteered that defendant was 
on parole, did the trial court act reasonably in denying a mistrial 
and immediately admonishing the jury to disregard the reference 
and, later, giving a curative jury instruction? 
An appellate court "will uphold the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion for a new trial unless [it] determine [s] the 
court has abused its discretion." State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930, 
932 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918-19, 
923 (Utah 1987). 
3. Was the evidence adduced at trial sufficient to support 
the jury's verdict of guilty? 
A criminal conviction will only be reversed for insufficient 
evidence when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable that 'reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime." State 
v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other grounds. State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 609(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, governing 
2 
impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime, provides: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the 
accused has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year under the law under which 
the witness was convicted, and the evidence 
that an accused has been convicted of such a 
crime shall be admitted if the court 
determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) , governing the determination 
of habitual criminals, states: 
Any person who has been convicted, 
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses 
at least one of which offenses having been at 
least a felony of the second degree or a crime 
which, if committed within this state would 
have been a capital felony, felony of the 
first degree or felony of the second degree, 
and was committed to any prison may, upon 
conviction of at least a felony of the second 
degree committed in this state, other than 
murder in the first or second degree, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1002 (1990), governing procedure and 
punishment of habitual criminals, provides in pertinent part: 
(2) If the defendant is bound over to the 
district court for trial, the county attorney 
shall in the information or complaint set 
forth the felony committed within the state of 
Utah and the two or more previous felony 
convictions relied upon for the charge of 
being a habitual criminal. If a jury is 
impaneled, it shall not be told of the 
previous felony convictions or charge of being 
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a habitual criminal. The trial on the felony 
committed within the state of Utah shall 
proceed as in other cases. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in a second amended information with one 
count of theft of an operable motor vehicle, a second degree 
felony. The information also stated that, upon conviction for the 
theft, defendant should be determined a habitual criminal, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 13-14) . Defendant was 
tried by a jury and convicted as charged (R. 86) . After 
stipulating to the existence of three previous felony convictions, 
defendant was then found to meet the statutory criteria for a 
habitual criminal (R. 89-90, 163) . Accordingly, pursuant to the 
statutory enhancement provision of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001, the 
court ordered him to serve a five year to life term in the Utah 
State Prison (R. 90) . Defendant then filed this timely appeal (R. 
92-93) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of November 22, 1993, Shontee Torres's mother 
noticed that her daughter's Camaro was not parked out in front of 
their home (R. 64) . Shortly thereafter, Shontee returned home and 
confirmed that the car was missing (R. 70) . They reported the 
loss, including $19 in cash and some personal items, to the Moab 
police (R. 66) . 
The car was spotted the next evening at Moab's City Market. 
When the police responded to that location, the vehicle was gone 
(R. 102). Shortly thereafter, the vehicle was sighted in front of 
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a trailer in a mobile home park in Grand County, south of Moab (R. 
78, 87, 102). Four police officers responded to the location (R. 
79) . One officer approached the home, knocked on the door, and was 
admitted by two young women. When the officer asked for the 
individual who had been driving the car, one of the women responded 
that she didn't know what he was talking about (R. 80). Although 
the woman denied that anyone else was in the trailer, the officer 
heard "a commotion in the back of this trailer house, footsteps, 
things being pushed around. I could tell, obviously, that a person 
. . . was back in the back of the home and they were rustling 
around" (R. 81) . The woman then gave the officer permission to 
look in the back of the trailer (R. 81). 
While the first officer had been approaching the front of the 
dwelling, a second officer had moved to the back of the trailer (R. 
88). Standing beneath and to the right of a window, he heard it 
open and then close again. He testified, "I figured that somebody 
had either seen me or heard me down below. . . .1 advised [a third 
officer] to just stand here in case anybody comes out of the 
window, and then I approached the front door, to meet with [the 
first officer] f! (R. 89). 
The two officers went to the back of the trailer (R. 89) . In 
the rear bedroom, they saw a foot sticking out from underneath a 
bed. They asked the individual to come out (R. 81, 90). When no 
response followed, one of the officers lifted up the bed, revealing 
defendant underneath (R. 82) . Defendant was taken into custody. 
The Camaro car keys and a driver's license in the name of Charles 
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Cox were subsequently found in his pocket (R. 91-92) . 
At the Sheriff's Office, defendant was mirandized. He then 
stated that he "had gotten loaded, saw the car with the keys in the 
ignition, and took it to help a friend move back to Moab from Grand 
Junction (R. 93-94, 108) . Defendant consistently represented, at 
the time he was first discovered in the trailer, at the Sheriff's 
Office, and again at trial, that he intended to return the vehicle: 
I mean, I wasn't going to just drive it up to 
her house or anything, pull out and everybody 
see me right there, and I figured, well, I'd 
try to get it as close to her house as I 
could, where a lot of people go so she'd get 
the car back. 
(R. 111. See also R. 85, 95, 107). Defendant asserted that he 
intended to leave the vehicle at the Moab City Park, but that the 
police had intercepted him before he was able to do so. Defendant 
also testified that he had planned to withdraw $19 from his bank 
account the next day and return it to Shontee Torres by placing it 
in her mailbox (R. 112). 
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged, of 
theft of an operable motor vehicle (R. 86). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Prior to admitting one of defendant's prior convictions, the 
trial court balanced the probativeness of the burglary conviction, 
as it went to defendant's credibility, against its potential 
prejudicial effect, as required by Utah rule of evidence 609(a) (1) 
and State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986). While reasonable 
minds may differ on admissibility, the trial court did not act 
unreasonably in striking a balance that favored probativeness. 
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Furthermore, the substance of defendant's own testimony reflected 
so poorly on his credibility that it rendered the brief reference 
to the prior conviction de minimis by comparison. 
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion for a mistrial, following an inadvertant 
reference by a witness to defendant's parole status. Once 
defendant's prior conviction had been admitted, the fact that 
defendant was on parole from prison added nothing of significance 
to the total picture before the jury at the time it rendered its 
decision. Furthermore, defendant has failed to show how he was 
prejudiced by the remark. And, the trial court obviated any error 
by immediately admonishing the jury to disregard the statement and 
by giving a curative jury instruction at the close of trial. 
Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's 
verdict. Defendant fails to appreciate that a jury may not only 
consider the evidence before it, but also the reasonable inferences 
that may be drawn from that evidence. When both are considered, 
the jury's verdict is amply supported. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR, AFTER CONDUCTING 
A PROPER BANNER ANALYSIS, IN ADMITTING 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION. AND, IN ANY 
EVENT, THE PRIOR CONVICTION DID NOT HAVE A 
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME, GIVEN THE 
UNBELIEVEABILITY OF DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANTIVE 
TESTIMONY 
The law is well-settled that "convictions for crimes not 
involving dishonesty or false statement cannot be used for 
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impeachment purposes in Utah unless they are felony convictions and 
the trial court has applied the proper balancing test under the 
rule [609(a)(1)]."1 State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653 (Utah 1989) 
(citations omitted). The balancing test includes consideration of 
at least five factors: 
[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on the 
character for veracity of the witness. 
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the prior 
conviction. . . . 
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to the 
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance may 
lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad 
person. 
[4] the importance of credibility issues in 
determining the truth in a prosecution tried 
without decisive nontestimonial evidence. . . . 
[5] the importance of the accused's testimony, as 
perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions 
probative of the accused's character for veracity. 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986).2 
In this case, defendant was asked on cross-examination if he 
had ever been convicted of a felony. When he stated that he had, 
the prosecution asked, "What felony and when?" (R. 116). Before 
defendant answered, his counsel asked for a brief recess and then 
1
 "Stealing-type crimes," including theft and burglary, are 
not necessarily crimes of "dishonesty or false statement," which 
are admitted automatically under rule 609(a)(2). They may be 
admitted pursuant to that section, however, if the court determines 
that "they were committed by fraudulent or deceitful means bearing 
directly on the accused's likelihood to testify truthfully." State 
v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989). Accord State v. Wight, 
765 P.2d 12, 18 (Utah App. 1988). In this case, no such 
determination about the prior conviction was made, and the 
conviction was admitted pursuant to rule 609(a)(1). 
2
 If circumstances additional to these are relevant, the 
trial court should also factor them into the balance. State v. 
Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 857 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 
897 (Utah 1993). 
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argued that defendant's prior convictions should all be 
inadmissible under the habitual criminal statute. The court 
rejected this argument.3 It observed that defendant's prior 
convictions should be analyzed "to determine whether the probative 
value outweighs the -- the prejudicial effect of the 
conviction[s] " (R. 118). The court then enumerated the Banner 
factors and concluded that defendant's prior convictions for 
possession of a stolen vehicle and larceny ought to be excluded 
because they were too similar to the charge at issue, theft of an 
operable motor vehicle (R. 119). The court then asked for 
arguments on the remaining conviction of burglary. While both 
sides offered statements, neither party analyzed the facts of the 
case under the relevant balancing test.4 
3
 Defendant's argument keys in on the following language in 
the statute governing procedure and punishment of habitual 
criminals: "If a jury is impaneled, it shall not be told of the 
previous felony convictions or charge of being a habitual 
criminal." The next sentence, however, states: "The trial on the 
felony committed within the state of Utah shall proceed as in other 
cases." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001(2). The plain import of this 
language is that the information used to support the habitual 
criminal charge is to be kept separate from the trial on the 
underlying felony. Only if defendant is convicted of the felony at 
issue will other past convictions come before the trier of fact for 
purposes of making the habitual criminal determination. Plainly, 
however, this statute does not preclude the use of a prior 
conviction for impeachment purposes if the prior conviction meets 
the standard for admissibility under rule 609. See R. 117-118 or 
Addendum A 
4
 Defendant argues on appeal that the State failed to carry 
its burden of demonstrating that the probative value of the prior 
conviction for burglary outweighed its prejudicial effect (Br. of 
App. at 11-13). Defendant, however, made no objection to the 
paucity of the analysis below, nor did defendant suggest that the 
court should not itself engage in the required analysis because the 
State failed to engage in it first. Under the circumstances, the 
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The trial court then proceeded methodically through the 
required Banner analysis. First, the court found that burglary was 
not a crime of dishonesty or false statement warranting automatic 
admission under rule 609(a)(2), but that: 
the crime of burglary is one that indicates --
it's on the -- it's on the range of those that 
indicate a willingness to depart from the 
standards of society. It's -- it's the kind 
of crime that -- that involves oftentimes, 
some sort of -- the use of subterfuge, it's 
done at night or it's done when people are 
unaware. It's kind of a -- for lack of a 
better word, kind of a sneaky crime. 
(R. 121 or Addendum A). The fair inference from the court's 
statement is that it believed burglary to be probative of 
credibility to a degree less than a crime formally recognized as 
one of dishonesty or false statement but more than a crime wholly 
unrelated to falsity. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb. 702 
F.2d 1049 (D.C.Cir. 1983) ("Robbery is generally less probative [of 
credibility] than crimes that involve deception or stealth. But it 
does involve theft and is a serious crime that shows conscious 
disregard for the rights of others. Such conduct reflects more 
strongly on credibility than, say, crimes of impulse, or simple 
narcotics or weapons possession"). 
Second, the court found that the 1991 burglary conviction was 
"about as recent as you could get with this defendant." (R. 121-22 
or Addendum A) . The recentness of the prior conviction plainly 
mandates in favor of probativeness. Cf. State v. Gentry. 747 P.2d 
issue has been waived. State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
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at 1037 (remoteness of ten year old rape conviction at time of 
trial "is a measure of its negligible probative value"); accord 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335. 
Third, the court found that burglary and theft of an operable 
motor vehicle were not similar crimes, stating: ,f[T]he jury's not 
likely to look at [the prior burglary conviction] and say he's 
committed a burglary before, so therefore, he must have committed 
theft of an automobile. They're different types of crimes" (R. 122 
or Addendum A). 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its evaluation 
of this factor (Br. of App. at 7-11) . Defendant takes issue on 
appeal with the court's reasoning only as to this factor, tacitly 
conceding that the court properly analyzed the remaining four 
factors. In essence, defendant believes that not only should the 
court have found this factor to be prejudicial, but that it was so 
prejudicial as to outweigh the other correctly-determined factors 
and tip the balance to exclusion. Defendant asserts that the 
admission was prejudicial because it would lead the jury to believe 
that defendant, because he stole once, would do it again (Br. of 
App. at 9).5 
Defendant, however, misperceives the crime of burglary, which 
may or may not include an act of theft. Utah's statute provides: 
"A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully 
5
 Defendant's brief muddles the distinction between admission 
of a prior conviction to impeach credibility and admission of a 
prior conviction substantively to show propensity to act in a 
certain way. The former is plainly admissible under the 
circumstances delineated in rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a 
felony or theft or commit an assault on any person." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (1990) (emphasis added) . In this case, there was 
no evidence before the court that defendant's prior conviction for 
burglary involved the element of theft. And, in any event, Banner 
requires a balancing test. Its success or failure does not ride on 
any single factor. Instead, the court must weigh all five factors 
to reach an equitable result. State v. Banner. 717 P.2d at 1334. 
The fourth and fifth factors, the importance of credibility in 
a case lacking in decisive nontestimonial evidence and the 
importance of the accused's testimony, are usually considered in 
tandem. See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335; State v. Gentry, 
747 P.2d at 1037. The trial court here found: "It is important to 
the prosecutor to . . . give the jury some sort of a basis for 
weighing his testimony against the testimony . . . of the other 
witnesses and weighing his explanation as to how truthful that 
really is. And although this -- certainly his testimony is also 
important to him, his explanation was already in through being 
quoted by the officers" (R. 122 or Addendum A) . Both of these 
factors, in the court's view, weighed in favor of admitting the 
prior conviction. Defendant's credibility was plainly important 
in assessing his intent. If the jury believed that he intended to 
return the car, it probably would not have convicted him as 
charged. The fourth factor, then, would lean towards admission of 
the prior conviction insofar as it might shed light on defendant's 
credibility. 
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Defendant's own, personal testimony, however, was not critical 
to his defense because all three police officers who testified 
agreed that defendant stated that he intended to return the vehicle 
(R. 85, 95, 107). The fifth factor, then, would not warrant 
exclusion because defendant did not have to take the stand and 
thereby open himself to cross examination about his prior 
conviction. Presumably, the main impetus for his testimony was to 
reveal evidence of his intent, and that evidence had already come 
in through the three officers. 
Having completed the appropriate analysis, the trial court 
concluded that the probative value of the prior conviction 
outweighed its possible prejudicial effect and admitted it (R. 122 
or Addendum A). In reviewing this determination, the trial court 
must be accorded a measure of discretion and should only be 
reversed if this Court concludes that the trial court acted 
unreasonably in striking the balance. State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 
at 781-82 n.3; State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270, n.ll) . The most 
that can be said in this case, however, is that reasonable minds 
could differ on admissibility. Under such circumstances, the 
determination of the trial court should be upheld. 
And, in any event, the admission of the prior conviction was 
overshadowed by the substance of defendant's testimony, which shed 
far more doubt on his credibility than his brief statement that he 
had been convicted of burglary in 1991. On cross-examination, 
defendant testified at length about his intention to return the $19 
he had taken from the vehicle to its owner. He stated he had 
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"recently" opened a bank account in Moab and that he had been 
planning to go to the bank the next day, withdraw a "$10 bill, five 
and some ones," and then go by Shontee Torres's house and put the 
money in her mailbox. If she turned out not to have a mailbox, he 
would "find some other way" to get the money back to her (R. 112-
16) . This story, on its face, raises serious questions about 
defendant's credibility. Its substance reflects the kind of common 
sense good planning that is highly inconsistent with defendant's 
admittedly impulsive behavior. Furthermore, the story smacks of 
after-the-fact rationalization, very similar to his stated intent 
to return the car. This testimony, reflecting so poorly on 
defendant's credibility, renders the brief mention of a prior 
conviction de minimis by comparison. Under the circumstances, it 
cannot be said that the admission of the prior conviction 
prejudiced defendant's substantial rights. 
Because the trial court conducted the proper legal analysis 
and acted reasonably in determining that the prior conviction was 
admissible, this Court should affirm that determination. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL 
WHERE THE COURT IMMEDIATELY ADMONISHED THE 
JURY TO DISREGARD THE STATEMENT AND 
SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE A CURATIVE JURY INSTRUCTION 
Deputy Sheriff Brewer testified about his interview with 
defendant at the Sheriff's Office following the arrest. He 
testified that defendant stated that he had taken a girlfriend to 
Grand Junction to pick up some belongings and then had returned to 
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Moab. The prosecution then asked, "Okay, what else?" (R. 94 or 
Addendum B). To this general query, the officer volunteered: "He 
did advise me that he had just been paroled from the Utah State 
Prison" (Id.). Defense counsel objected, and the court immediately 
responded: "The jury will disregard any -- any of that" (Id.). 
Out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial (R. 99 or Addendum C) . The court denied the motion, 
stating: 
Well, the -- the testimony was clearly 
inadmissible, at least at this point I'd have 
to say that it was inadmissible. I can't see 
any -- any way that the fact that he was on 
parole would -- would be admissible in 
evidence. 
[The prosecutor] did not specifically ask 
for that information. It would have been 
better if Deputy Brewer had -- had known not 
to volunteer that, or been instructed by [the 
prosecutor] not to volunteer that; but on the 
other hand, [defense counsel] also would have 
had an opportunity to — to know that that was 
a possibility that that would come out and 
file a motion. 
I'm going to deny the motion for a 
mistrial. [Defense counsel], I will give 
whatever curative instruction you may request 
about that because it clearly should be 
disregarded by the jury. If you want to 
request a curative instruction, I'll -- I will 
give as emphatic an instruction as you would 
1 ike, that it's something that' s - - that 
shouldn't have anything to do with the jury's 
decision in the case. 
(R. 99-100 or Addendum C) . Later in the discussion, the court 
further observed: 
"My impression is that that kinda -- that went 
by kinda fast, and -- and I didn't want to 
make a big deal out of sustaining the 
objection. And so I didn't -- didn't do that, 
just told the jury that they should — they 
should disregard that. And my impression is, 
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it's not something that made much of a stir in 
the courtroom, but I will give whatever 
curative instruction you request . . . on that 
subject." 
R. 100-101 or Addendum C) . Defense counsel subsequently requested 
a curative instruction, which the trial court gave (R. 160, 70).6 
On appeal, defense counsel asserts that the officer's single 
statement, in conjunction with the admission of the prior 
conviction, unfairly prejudiced the jury against him (Br. of App. 
at 19-20). However, the two alleged errors cannot be cumulated in 
this manner. Once defendant's prior felony conviction had been 
admitted, the fact that defendant was on parole from prison added 
nothing of significance to the total picture before the jury at the 
time it reached its decision. Surely, it would come as no surprise 
to a jury that someone convicted of a felony had been sentenced to 
prison. 
In any event, a trial court "has broad discretion in 
determining whether a mistrial should be declared, and the denial 
of a motion for a mistrial does not constitute an abuse of 
discretion where no prejudice to the accused is shown." State v. 
Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1981) . In this case, the court 
observed that the officer's reference to parole was "not something 
6
 Jury instruction number 11 stated, in pertinent part: 
Whether or not defendant was on parole at 
the time he is accused of committing a crime 
is not in evidence. You should completely 
disregard anything you may have heard in that 
connection. It has no bearing on the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant and has not met the 
standards for admissibility in this court. 
R. 70. 
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that made much of a stir in the courtroom" (R. 101) . See State v. 
Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1373 (Utah 1989) (court affirms denial of 
mistrial motion, observing as one factor that trial court had 
noticed no visible reaction from jury when reference to parole 
officer was made)• In addition, the remark was very brief and was 
made only in passing. See State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 
(Utah 1988) (court affirms denial of mistrial motion, citing as one 
factor that "the witness's reference to the warrant was very brief 
and was only made in passing"). 
Furthermore, the trial court obviated any error by immediately 
admonishing the jury to disregard the statement and by giving the 
requested curative instruction at the close of trial. See State v. 
Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993). The volunteered statement by 
the officer, while not beneficial to defendant, was not so 
prejudicial as to create a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for defendant in its absence. State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989). Under the circumstances, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's 
motion for a mistrial. 
POINT THREE 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT OF 
GUILTY 
In conducting a review for sufficiency of the evidence, this 
Court should not disturb the jury's verdict "so long as some 
evidence and reasonable inferences11 support the jury's decision. 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990). 
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In this case, Defendant argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the intent element of the offense for which 
he was convicted. Theft of an operable motor vehicle requires 
unauthorized control over the property of another "with a purpose 
to deprive him [sic] thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. 
"Purpose to deprive" is statutorily defined as a conscious 
objective: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for 
so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon 
payment of a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(3) (1990). Because defendant 
consistently maintained that his intent was to return the vehicle 
to Moab City Park and because defendant returned to Moab after 
taking the vehicle, he believes the State has failed to adduce 
sufficient evidence of intent to support the conviction. 
Defendant has failed, however, to consider the inferences that 
may properly be drawn from the testimony adduced at trial. While 
the jury could have believed defendant's testimony that he intended 
to return the vehicle, it also could have reasonably inferred that 
defendant's stated intent was fabricated as a convenient way out of 
a sticky situation. Bolstering this inference is defendant's 
improbable testimony that he intended to return the money he took 
from Shontee's vehicle by withdrawing it from his bank account and 
placing it in her mailbox the next day. Both statements smack of 
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after-the-fact rationalization. A reasonable inference from the 
facts adduced at trial is that defendant intended to keep the car, 
but was simply caught short by prompt police action. See, e.g. , 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 1072-73 (defendant's intent to commit 
theft could be inferred from circumstances, including his unlikely 
explanation for his presence in a stranger's home). 
Similarly, while defendant's return to Moab could be 
interpreted as evidence of his intent to return the vehicle, it 
could also simply be the act of an individual who behaves 
impulsively and does not think of the consequences of his acts. 
Indeed, defendant freely admitted that he took the car "on impulse" 
(R. 108) . His unthinking behavior in that instance is consistent 
with his later acts of audibly moving around the back of the 
trailer and then assuming that lying quietly under the bed would 
hide him, even if his foot was sticking out. 
It is, of course, the jury's prerogative both to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses and to weigh their testimony. State 
v. Martinez, 709 P.2d 355, 356 (Utah 1985) . This court does not 
"sit as a second fact finder" nor does it "determine the 
credibility of witnesses." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 
(Utah 1994). Certainly, if the jury had believed defendant's 
version of events and disbelieved all the other witnesses, it could 
have acquitted him. But the jury chose not to do so, and defendant 
has not shown how the evidence and inferences that may properly be 
drawn from it are so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
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defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. 
Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). Under such circumstances, 
this Court should not disturb the jury's decision. State v. Moore. 
802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990). Accord State v. Booker, 709 
P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ZO day of September, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Discussion of Prior Conviction Admissibility 
1 A No. I don't. 
2 Q Okay. What would you have done if she didn't? 
3 A Well, I would have had to find out some other way. 
4 Q Mr. Gauger, have you ever been convicted of a 
5 felony? 
6 A Yes. I have. 
7 Q What felony and when? 
8 I MS. STARLEY: Your Honor, if we could have a brief 
9 recess to discuss this. I believe there's an issue. 
10 THE COURT: Members of the jury, an issue's arisen 
11 which requires that I make a determination as to whether 
12 evidence is admissible or not, and I'm going to excuse you so 
13 that I can make that ruling and--outside of your presence. 
14 So, I'll go ahead and ask you to leave the courtroom and have 
15 the bailiff come and get you when it's time for you to come 
16 back into the courtroom. I hope it won't take too much time. 
17 Oh, that's right. And members of the jury, 
18 remember, don't discuss the case, don't allow anyone to 
19 discuss it in your presence, don't make up your mind to any 
20 issue until it's finally submitted to you; but you can get a 
21 drink of water if you'd like. 
MS. STARLEY: Your Honor, under the habitual 
criminal code section, 78-8-101, it states that any crime that 
24 I is, or conviction that is relied upon to charge the defendant 
25 with habitual criminal cannot be brought up to the jury. 
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1 And I believe from my review of his criminal history 
2 that all his felony convictions would have--would come under 
3 that. I believe all of them have been listed on the 
4 Information as the ones that the State is relying upon. 
5 MR. BENGE: Your Honor, I tend to agree with the 
6 fact that I couldn't bring it up to the jury without--without 
7 his denying it; however, I still believe--I don't think that 
8 obviates my ability to ask him, for credibility purposes, 
9 whether he's been convicted of a felony and what felony and 
10 when. 
11 THE COURT: Well, I interpret that provision as--as 
12 meaning nothing more than that during the trial on the 
13 underlying charge, where habitual criminal is--is also 
14 charged, that--that the jury will not receive information as 
15 to the prior convictions with regard to the habitual criminal 
16 charge, so that--so there's no cross-contamination there. 
17 I don't interpret that as--as meaning that the rules 
18 that would ordinarily apply for introduction of felony 
19 convictions to impeach a witness would--would be abrogated, so 
20 I think those--those rules are--the application of Rule 609 or 
21 Rule 404(b) are not affected, not intended to'be affected by 
22 that statute, and a reasonable reading of it, they would not 
23 be a f f e c t e d . 
24 So, they 're c e r t a i n l y not admissible t o show that 
25 h e ' s a habitual criminal at t h i s s tage ; but i f they 're 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
 117 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
1 admissible for purposes of credibility when he takes the 
2 stand, they'd be admissible on the same basis as in any other 
3 case, where--if they were admissible to show anything else 
4 under Rule 404(b). 
5 So, let's move on to that next question then, Mr. 
6 Benge. Are you introducing them for any purpose under Rule 4-
7 
8 | MR. BENGE: For impeachment purposes, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Under Rule 609, then? 
10 MR. BENGE: Yes, sir. 
11 THE COURT: All right. And under Rule 609, I'm 
12 supposed to determine whether the probative value outweighs 
13 the--the prejudicial effect of this--this testimony, or of the 
14 conviction, and under State vs. Banner, I'm supposed to 
15 consider five factors. They are: does the crime bear on the 
16 veracity of the witness and to what extent, and I'm assuming 
17 there that I'm supposed to evaluate all of those felonies that 
18 are not--do not involve dishonesty or false statement, 
19 testimonial dishonesty or false statement, 'cause those 
20 automatically come in anyway, so I'm supposed to evaluate 
21 these particular convictions to find out whether those kinds 
22 of crimes, how much they bear on veracity. I suppose there 
23 would be a range, intoxication, well, of course, it's not a 
24 felony. Anyway, I need to--I would need to evaluate that. 
25 The recentness or the remoteness is something I'm 
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1 supposed to consider. The similarity to the charged crime, 
2 'cause it bears on the prejudice, the--the rule of thumb is 
3 that there would be a rare, rare case when a crime similar to 
4 what's being charged would be admissible, because it would--in 
5 the jury's mind, it would tend to overshadow everything else. 
6 1 So, I'm probably going to--with that presumption, 
7 I'm probably going to leave out anything that involves this 
8 same kind of offense. So, possession of a stolen vehicle is — 
9 is out. Probably ought--larceny ought to be out as veil, or 
10 probably will be out as well. 
11 So, the only one we're left with is this burglary 
12 conviction on January 4th, 1991. And then I'm supposed to 
13 evaluate the importance to the prosecution, is their decisive 
14 non--non-testimonial evidence that would allow the jury to 
15 evaluate this testimony, and which is kind of the reverse of 
16 the same coin; how important is the accused testimony. 
X7 And those appear to be the--two sides of the same 
18 coin. If it's important to the prosecution, it's also 
19 important to the defense, although I think what they're 
80 getting at there is it may be a situation where it is not that 
21 important that the defendant be permitted to testify and--or 
22 that he be permitted to testify without his credibility being 
23 attacked with felony convictions. 
24 For example, there may be a case where his defense 
25 is apparent from all the other evidence that's been submitted 
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1 and—and when he takes the stand, he's just trying to get a 
2 little extra advantage, and if he's doing that, and it's not 
3 essential to take the stand in order to present his defense, 
4 then that should be considered in--in weighing the prejudice 
5 versus the probative value. 
6 So, with that being a factor, let's hear with regard 
7 to the burglary conviction in 1991, what your arguments are 
S about prejudice versus probative value. Mr- Benge? 
9 MR. BENGE: Your Honor, I just think that it--it--it 
10 just goes to the issue of his credibility, and the prejudicial 
11 factor, I--I can't say. I guess I'd leave that up to Sandra 
12 to argue, but it certainly, to me, if I were sitting on a 
13 jury, I would want to know if this person were a sweet 
14 innocent or if he--if he had some reason to be fabricating 
15 this story. 
16 THE COURT: Ms. Starley? 
17 MS. STARLEY: I think for that same reason is why 
18 it's prejudicial to the defendant. To have the jury know that 
19 he has been convicted of a felony will impact them and make 
20 them weigh his credibility differently, and I think his 
2i credibility is a central issue; although there is testimony 
22 already in as to him testifying at--or telling the officers at 
23 the time what he intended to do with the vehicle. 
24 His credibility, though, is a very important issue, 
25 and I think that will be compromised by admitting the felony 
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1 conviction. 
2 MR. BENGE: I agree it would be compromised and 
3 that's the exact reason we're trying to get it in. 
4 THE COURT: Right. And the idea is, the law says# 
5 we don't want the jury to say he's done it# he's committed a 
6 felony before; therefore, he must be guilty of any crime. 
7 MS. STARLEY: That's my biggest concern. 
8 THE COURT: And on the other hand, if he has done 
9 something in the past that indicates a willingness to depart 
10 from the standards of society, that may also mean that he's 
11 willing to depart from the standards of society by not telling 
12 the truth when he's on the witness stand. 
13 And so as I evaluate these five factors, I find that 
14 this is the kind of crime--it is not a crime of testimonial 
15 dishonesty or a false statement. That comes in no matter what 
16 under Rule 609; but among the crimes that don't come in 
17 automatically, the crime of burglary is one that indicates--
18 it's on the--it's on the range of those that indicate a 
19 willingness to depart from the standards of society. It's--
20 it's the kind of crime that—that involves oftentimes, some 
21 sort of--the use of subterfuge, it's done at night or it's 
22 done when people are unaware. It's kind of a--for lack of a 
23 better word, kind of a sneaky crime. 
24 It--this conviction is recent or remote--or it--this 
25 is not remote, it's recent, it's about as recent as you could 
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1 get with this defendant. 
2 It is not similar to the charged crime. They're--
3 the jury's not likely to look at it and say he's committed a 
4 burglary before, so therefore, he must have committed theft of 
5 an automobile. They're different kinds of crimes. 
6 It is important to the prosecutor to--to have the 
7 jury--give the jury some sort of a basis for weighing his 
6 testimony against the testimony of other--of the other 
9 witnesses and weighing his explanation as to how truthful that 
10 really is. And although this--certainly his testimony is also 
11 important to him, his explanation was already in through being 
12 quoted by the officers. 
13 So, the Court finds that--that the--even with 
14 recognizing that the burden is on the prosecution, that the 
15 prior conviction for burglary, a third-degree felony, in--on 
16 January 4th, 1991, in Third District Court, the probative 
17 value does outweigh the prejudicial value, and that will be 
18 admitted; but the--the other two, the record of the other two 
19 felonies will not be admitted. 
20 Mr. Bailiff, you can escort the jury back into the 
21 courtroom. 
22 So, just answer about that. 
23 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: Is the only one you have to answer 
25 about. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Parole Comment and Objection 
1 A Mr. Gauger waived his rights, I had some questions 
2 that I wanted to ask Mr. Gauger, which I did. I asked Mr. 
3 Gauger if he'd stolen the vehicle. Basically, I asked him if 
4 he would just go through the story of when he took the 
5 vehicle. He advised me that he had been at the Wickem 
6 residence, he had gotten loaded. He was--he walked from the 
7 Wickem residence to the Hillyard, which is northeast of the 
B residence that he'd left. 
9 He passed by this--this car in question, the Camaro, 
10 he observed the keys in the ignition. He walked around to the 
11 passenger side, got in the vehicle and drove off. He told--
12 Q Did he say where he went? 
13 A He told me that he picked up his girlfriend, Shilo 
14 Walker, took her to Grand Junction to pick up some of her 
15 belongings, that he was moving her back to Moab. And which he 
16 stated he did drive to Grand Junction and then brought her 
17 back. 
18 Q Okay. What else? 
19 A He did advise me that he had just been paroled from 
20 the Utah State Prison. 
2i MS. STARLEY: Objection, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Sustained. The jury will disregard any-
23 -any of that. 
24 Q (By Mr. Benge) Did he make any other statements? 
25 A Can I look at my notes? 
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ADDENDUM C 
Ruling on Motion for Mistrial 
1 afternoon, coordinate your watches to the clock on the wall 
2 there, if you have any doubt about what time it is. 
3 Are there any matters that we need to address? 
4 MS. STARLEY: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: All right. We'll go ahead and excuse 
6 the jury at this time. Come back at 1:30. We have a few 
7 things we need to talk about that you don't have to concern 
6 yourselves with. 
9 (Whereupon, the jury was excused from the 
10 courtroom.) 
11 THE COURT: The record will show that the Court's in 
12 session outside of the hearing of the jury. 
13 Ms. Starley? 
14 MS. STARLEY: Yes. I would be moving--moving for a 
15 mistrial on the basis of Mr. Brewer's comment that Mr. Gauger 
16 had just been paroled from the State Prison. 
17 MR. BENGE: Your Honor, I'd, of course, strenuously 
IB object to that. Mr. Brewer was just reciting in toto the 
19 elements, or the items told to him by Mr. Gauger. Ms. Starley 
20 was privy to his report from the outset in this matter. If 
21 she wanted him to be cautioned by me not to go" into that, or 
22 cautioned by the Court not to go into that, she's certainly 
23 had ample opportunity to make a motion in limine. 
24 THE COURT: Well, the--the testimony was clearly 
25 inadmissible, at least at this point I'd have to say that it 
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1 was inadmissible. I can't see any—any way that the fact that 
2 he was on parole would--would be admissible in evidence. 
3 Mr. Benge did not specifically ask for that 
4 information. It would have been better if Deputy Brewer had--
5 had known not to volunteer that, or been instructed by Mr. 
6 Benge not to volunteer that; but on the other hand, Ms. 
7 Starley also would have had an opportunity to--to know that 
8 that was a possibility that that would come out and file a 
9 motion. 
10 I'm going to deny the motion for a mistrial. Ms. 
11 Starley, I will give whatever curative instruction you may 
12 request about that because it clearly should be disregarded by 
13 the jury. If you want to request a curative instruction, 
14 I'11--I will give as emphatic an instruction as you would 
15 like, that it's something that's—that shouldn't have anything 
16 to do with the jury's decision in the case. 
17 MS. STARLEY: Can I reserve that issue until the 
IS instruction time? 
19 THE COURT: Yes. 
20 MS. STARLEY: And I'll make that decision as to 
2i whether--we always have the problem with emphasizing it by 
22 doing a curative. 
23 THE COURT: Whether you should bring--whether you 
24 should bring it up again. My impression is that that kinda--
25 that went by kinda fast, and--and I didn't want to make a big 
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1 deal out of sustaining the objection. And so I didn't--didn't 
2 do that, just told the jury that they should--they should 
3 disregard that. And my impression is, it's not something that 
4 made much of a stir in the courtroom, but I will give whatever 
5 curative instruction you request, Ms. Starley, on that 
6 subject. 
7 Court will be in recess until 1:30 this afternoon. 
6 (Recess.) 
9 THE COURT: All right. Members of the jury, have 
10 you done any of those things I told you not to do? I'm 
11 supposed to ask. I'm supposed to remind you every time and 
12 ask you to make sure you didn't. All right. Or has anyone 
13 tried to do any of those things with you? If any of that 
14 happens, you report it to the bailiff, and I'll have him--or 
15 report it to the clerk and I'll address that with you. 
16 All right. Mr. Benge, I think we were still with 
17 you. 
18 MR. BENGE: Officer Craig Bowen. 
19 CRAIG BOWEN, 
20 called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this 
21 matter, after having been first duly sworn, was examined and 
22 testified as follows: 
23 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR. BENGE: 
25 Q State your name for the Court, p l e a s e . 
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